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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of marriage regulation on the migratory 
behavior of individuals using the history of the liberalization of same-sex marriage across 
the United States. Because the approval of same-sex marriage allows homosexuals access to 
legal rights and social benefits, marriage becomes more attractive relative to singlehood or 
other forms of partnership. The differences in the value of other forms of relationship status 
relative to marriage can affect the migration decisions of individuals, to the extent that those 
states approving same-sex marriage can be considered less discriminatory. Results show that 
that legal reform permanently increased the migration flow of homosexuals moving to 
tolerant states (i.e., those that have legalized same-sex marriage). The physical distance 
among states does not appear to be driving our estimates since the migration flow of 
homosexuals is not limited to border or close states. Supplemental analysis, developed to 
explore whether the migration flow is translated to a significant effect to the stock of 
homosexuals by state, suggests that that stock increased after the approval of same-sex 
marriage but that it was transitory, pointing to a ‘no effect’ on the spatial distribution of 
homosexuals as times went by. The liberalization of marriage for homosexuals also has an 
effect on the migration behavior of those individuals originating from countries in which 
same-sex sexual activity is illegal, for whom we observe an outflow migration from those 
states with same sex marriage, pointing to dissimilarities in cultural aspects related to 
homosexuality as important factors in migration decisions. 
 
Keywords: Homosexuals, marriage, migration 
JEL Codes: J12, J15, Z13  
Corresponding Author: Miriam Marcén 
Universidad de Zaragoza 
Gran Vía 2 
50005 Zaragoza (Spain) 
mmarcen@unizar.es 
Telephone: +34876554684 
 
Marina Morales 
Universidad de Zaragoza 
Gran Vía 2 
50005 Zaragoza (Spain) 
mcmorales@unizar.es 
Telephone: +34876554684 
 
 
  
2 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The location choice of homosexuals (gays and lesbians) has been partly analyzed in the 
economic literature on homosexual behavior (Black et al., 2007). Using urban economic 
models, it has been suggested that the geographic distribution of homosexuals depends on 
the access to amenities (Black et al., 2002, 2007). However, other factors can also play a role 
(Vossen et al., 2019). The homosexual-related factors that have dramatically changed during 
the last two decades across the world are located in the area of legislation (ILGA World, 
2019). One of those major recent policy changes is the approval of same-sex marriage which 
has been introduced in 29 out of the 195 countries in the world (ILGA World, 2019; national 
legislations). In the U.S., since the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 2003 
that the ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional (Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, 2003), there was a progressive increase in the number of states extending same-sex 
marriage until 2015. The U.S. Supreme Court (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015) opened that form 
of partnership for same-sex couples to the rest of the country. Although researchers have 
found that Americans have not been historically tolerant of homosexuality because the 
majority of them—at least until the last decade—considered that homosexual practice is 
morally wrong (Brumbaugh et al., 2008), empirical evidence indicates that states where 
same-sex marriage was allowed were less prejudiced (Hooghe and Meeusen, 2013), making 
them more attractive to homosexuals (Black et al., 2007). In our work, we examine whether 
the introduction of same-sex marriage in the U.S. had an impact on the migratory behavior 
of homosexuals.1 
 It is not only being a homosexual friendly state (those that have liberalized same-sex 
marriage) that may matter for attracting homosexuals; access to marriage can also be a 
motivation for their change of residence. Marriage allows individuals access to more 
citizenship rights, welfare benefits, tax benefits, health care, social, property and parental 
rights than any other form of partnership in the U.S. For example, homosexuals cannot be 
covered by their partner’s employer-provided health insurance and non-married couples 
cannot file taxes jointly in the U.S. (see an extensive review in Badgett, 2009). The gains 
derived from marriage are not limited to economic and welfare benefits and legal rights; 
researchers suggest that marriage may help homosexuals to gain recognition and support 
(Ocobock, 2013). From a theoretical point of view, the Beckerian framework, which mainly 
focuses on the behavior of heterosexual couples (Becker, 1973; Black et al., 2007), could be 
applicable here. In this setting, individuals choose to marry when their expected lifetime 
utility derived from marriage exceeds the expected utility from remaining single. Then, those 
states where same-sex marriage is legal would be a potentially attractive place of residence 
for those homosexuals whose expected utility in marriage exceeds that of remaining single. 
Differences across regions or even countries in terms of public policies and legislation 
has been found to have an effect on the migration behavior of individuals (Gelbach, 2004; 
Gius, 2011; McKinnish, 2005, 2007; Fiva, 2009; Jofre-Monseny, 2014). In the case of how 
dissimilarities in legislation may affect the mobility of sexual minority groups, the literature 
                                                            
1
 We use the term homosexual to refer to gays and lesbians. 
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is inconclusive, since the homosexual community has consistently been overlooked in most 
migration studies (Black et al., 2007). Pinello (2016) carries out a comprehensive survey of 
the effects of same-sex marriage legalization on gay and lesbian couples across six states in 
the U.S., and Beaudin (2017), using micro-level data, suggests that heads of households in 
both different- and same-sex relationships are more likely to leave states where same-sex 
marriage is not legal. She also points (without showing empirical evidence) to the possibility 
that same-sex marriage could be increasing the imbalanced geographic distribution of same- 
and different-sex couples across the U.S. Further research is necessary to analyze the long-
run effects of same-sex marriage legalization on the mobility of homosexuals. 
There is a growing literature analyzing the effect of same-sex marriage legalization on 
different socioeconomic and demographic variables. Langbein and Yost (2009) explore 
whether the legal recognition of same-sex marriage has an adverse impact on outcomes 
related to traditional family values, finding that same-sex marriages do not have any negative 
externality. Hatzenbuehler et al. (2012) study the effect of the enactment of same-sex 
marriage legislation in Massachusetts on health care use and expenditure among gay and 
bisexual men, and Francis et al. (2012) analyze the relationship between same-marriage laws 
and sexually transmitted infections. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, Dillender 
(2014) examines how changes in U.S. legal recognition allowing same-sex couples to marry 
have altered marriage rates in the U.S., and Trandafir (2015) studies the effect on marriage, 
divorce and extramarital births in OECD countries, finding positive effects on family 
formation. More recently, Hansen et al. (2019) explore the effect of same-sex marriage on 
labor supply, and reveal mixed results (i.e., no effect on gay men and a negative effect on 
lesbian women labor supply). 
In our paper, we supplement the previous literature by firstly analyzing the dynamic 
response of homosexual migration to same-sex marriage legalization, which allows us to 
study whether the effect of the reforms is transitory or permanent. To do that, we construct a 
panel formed by the 50 states of the U.S. and the District of Columbia covering the period 
2001 to 2015. We use data from the American Community Survey of the Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al., 2018), to analyze the effect of the legalization 
of same-sex marriage on homosexuals moving people between states. From that dataset, we 
can only observe the behavior of those gay men and lesbian women who are cohabiting, as 
in the previous literature (Black et al., 2007; Negrusa and Oreffice, 2011; Hansen et al., 
2019). We identify the relationship between the migration flow of homosexuals and same-
sex marriage by exploiting the legislative history of the liberalization of same-sex marriage 
across the United States. Our results suggest that the introduction of same-sex marriage 
increases the percentage of homosexuals who move to a state having same-sex marriage, and 
this effect does not disappear over time. In all our regressions, we account for unobservable 
state-specific factors by including state-fixed effects as well as time-varying characteristics 
by adding year-fixed effects. We also include state-specific time trends to control for 
unobserved time varying factors at the state level, such as changing social norms or slow-
moving demographic trends. Our results are unaffected after controlling for observable 
characteristics at the state level. We provide additional evidence suggesting that our results 
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are not driven by other legislative changes related to discrimination based on gender identity 
in adoption, employment, housing and public accommodation, the gender marker change on 
birth certificates, and the repeal of sodomy laws.  
We add to the literature, secondly, by studying whether the relationship between same-
sex marriage legalization and homosexual migration varies depending on the physical 
distance between sending and receiving states. This can be important in this framework 
because the introduction of same-sex marriage was phased in and not all gays and lesbians 
had a close state with same-sex marriage. In addition, migration pattern in terms of physical 
distance of homosexuals may be different to that of their heterosexual counterparts when 
there is a change in a public policy or legislation. Homosexuals appear to earn less than their 
heterosexual counterparts in the U.S. and in other countries (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2010; 
Badgett, 1995; Clain and Leppel, 2001; Grossbard and Jepsen, 2008), generating budget 
constraints to move to a non-close state because the greater the physical distance the higher 
the migration costs (Belot and Hatton, 2012; Bellido and Marcén, 2015). However, the 
opposite could be possible. With low wages, opportunity costs would be lower for 
homosexuals, encouraging migration for homosexuals. Also, since homosexual households 
are less likely to have children, this reduces over a lifetime the necessities of some household 
resources (Black et al., 2002; Grossbard and Jensen, 2008), which can make them free for 
the migration process. Then, how the physical distance may affect the migration flow of 
homosexuals is not clear in the theoretical framework. Our empirical findings suggest that 
the migration flow of homosexuals as a consequence of the liberalization of same-sex 
marriage occurs between non-close states, and this is not a transitory movement. There is not 
a statistically significant effect in the case of neighboring states, suggesting that the migration 
costs caused by physical distance does not appear to matter. 
Another unexplored issue related to the effect of same-sex marriage is how this can 
affect to the stock of homosexuals. As mentioned above, Beaudin (2017), without showing 
empirical evidence, points out the possibility that the phased introduction of same-sex 
marriage across the U.S. could be changing the spatial distribution of homosexuals. We can 
check this focusing on the analysis of the dynamic response of the stock of homosexuals to 
the liberalization of same-sex marriage. Thus, our work is not limited to the exploration of 
the migration flow of homosexuals; we also pay attention on the evolution of the stock of 
homosexuals, which is our third contribution to the literature. We find that there is an impact 
on the stock of homosexuals after the introduction of same-sex marriage, but that is 
transitory. Therefore, we do not detect empirical evidence in favor of a change in the 
geographic distribution of homosexuals as a consequence of same-sex marriage. It appears 
to have a permanent impact on mobility, but this is not translated to any significant degree to 
the spatial distribution of homosexuals. 
To our knowledge, there is also a lack of research relating to how the introduction of 
same-sex marriage affects those individuals originating from countries that are not tolerant 
of same-sex relations. On the one hand, it can be surmised that tolerant states (those with 
same-sex marriage) would be more attractive for those individuals who flee persecution 
because of the criminalization of same-sex relations in their country of origin. One way to 
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examine this issue is exploring data on asylum seekers by type of persecution (including 
gender identity and sexual orientation). Unfortunately, as is explained by the Center for 
Gender & Refugee Studies, the absence of official reporting on asylum cases at most stages 
of adjudication make this analysis impossible. On the other hand, states having same-sex 
marriage would be culturally dissimilar to non-tolerant countries in terms of sexual 
orientation, reducing the incentives to live in those states for individuals originating from 
non-tolerant countries. We find empirical evidence that appears to confirm this behavior, 
which is our fourth contribution to the existing literature. The percentage of individuals 
originating from countries that criminalize same-sex relations decreases in those state with 
same-sex marriage, and the effect appears to be permanent. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical 
strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Our results are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To identify the effect of same-sex marriage legalization on the interstate migration flow of 
individuals, our empirical approach makes use of the variations in the timing of the 
introduction of same-sex marriage across the U.S. Since the exact date on which same-sex 
marriage was legalized can be considered exogenous, the use of the history of legalization of 
same-sex marriage allows us to analyze the causal link between same-sex marriage and the 
migration behavior of individuals.2 We follow Wolfers’s methodology (Wolfers, 2006) to 
pick up the dynamic effect of same-sex marriage legalization. Formally, we estimate: ܲܪܯ௖௧ ൌ Σୱߚ௦݈݈݁݃ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௖௧௦ ൅ Σୡܵݐܽݐ݁ܨܧ௖ ൅ Σ୲ܻ݁ܽݎܨܧ௧൅	ሾΣୡܵݐܽݐ݁௖ ൈܶ݅݉݁௧ ൅ Σୡܵݐܽݐ݁௖ ൈ ܶ݅݉݁௧ଶሿ ൅ ݑ௖௧							ሺ1ሻ  
where ܲܪܯ௖௧ is the percentage of homosexuals who move to state c in the year t. This 
variable is defined as the number of homosexual migrants over the total homosexuals at risk 
of migrating multiplied by 100. In the denominator, the individuals at risk of migrating 
incorporates all identifiable homosexuals living in the rest of the states in year t, excluding 
those living in state c in year t. Our main explanatory variable, ݈݈݁݃ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௖௧௦, is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 when state c has legal same-sex marriage in year t for s period, 
and 0 otherwise. In this way, equation (1) includes dummies showing whether same-sex 
marriage has been effective for 1-2 years, 3-4 years, and so on. As explained above, those 
states that have same-sex marriage can be considered tolerant and are more attractive to 
homosexuals, but the access to marriage (which implies legal rights and social benefits) may 
                                                            
2 Using methodologies quite similar to that presented here, we have found those papers that examine the role 
of several law reforms on different outcomes. For example, some researchers focus their attention on the impact 
of divorce law reforms on divorce rates (Wolfers, 2006; González-Val and Marcén, 2012), fertility rates 
(Bellido and Marcén, 2014), marriage rates (Drewianka, 2008) and suicide and domestic violence (Stevenson 
and Wolfers, 2006). Other papers have considered the effect of custody law reforms on marriage rates and 
fertility rates (Halla, 2013), economic well-being (Del Boca and Ribero, 1998; Allen et al., 2011) and 
educational attainment (Leo, 2008; Nunley and Seals, 2011). In all these cases, the empirical approach is based 
on the exogeneity of the exact date on which the law reforms are introduced. 
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alone be sufficient to encourage their migration. In this setting, we would expect ߚ௦ 
parameters to be positive indicating that the inflow migration of homosexuals to state c has 
increased after s periods since the introduction of same-sex marriage. The interpretation of a 
negative sign would be just the opposite. We include state- and year-fixed effects in equation 
(1) to account for evolving unobserved attributes varying at the state level and over time. In 
addition, we account for pre-existing differences across states incorporating the interaction 
between the state-fixed effects and calendar and quadratic calendar time. It is possible that 
unobservable factors such as culture or demographic trends evolve over time at different 
paces in different states. For example, in one state, it may be more socially acceptable to have 
a same-sex partner, while in others it may be less so. Those states where the social norm 
associated with homosexual couples was reducing faster would experience higher increases 
in the percentage of homosexuals moving in and might also be more likely to introduce same-
sex marriage. Adding state-specific linear and quadratic trends can capture these issues. 
Regressions are estimated by population-weighted least squares. 
 This methodology allows us to analyze the dynamic response of the homosexual 
migration flow to changes in marriage access (dynamic model). Prior literature is limited to 
the exploration of how same-sex marriage may affect the probability of homosexual and 
heterosexual couple migration using microdata (Beaudin, 2017). In our case, we use 
aggregate data to examine how same-sex marriage affects the evolution of homosexual 
migration flow. The rest of our work also applies a similar empirical strategy to that presented 
in this section (see below for a detailed explanation) to examine the importance of the 
physical distance on the migration process, the possible impact on the stock of homosexuals, 
and the migration process of those individuals originating from non-tolerant countries with 
same-sex relations.  
3. DATA 
The dataset used in this work cover the 50 states of the U.S. and the District of Columbia 
from 2001 to 2015. The migration flow of individuals is calculated by using data from the 
American Community Survey of Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles 
et al., 2018). The IPUMS provides information on the state of residence during the previous 
year. This allows us to calculate the number of individuals who have moved from one state 
to another in the previous year.3 To identify whether an individual is homosexual, we are 
only capable of observing those men and women living with a partner of the same-sex in the 
IPUMS sample. This data limitation is common to other works using the IPUMS (Black et 
al., 2007; Negrusa and Oreffice, 2011; Hansen et al., 2019, among others).4 Our sample 
selection consists of homosexuals aged 30 (beyond the education period and after the period 
of more intense job mobility (Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 2018; Borghans and Golsteyn, 
2012)) to 64 (below retirement age) who can legally marry (single, divorcee, or widower).  
                                                            
3
 To do this, we use the weights provided by the IPUMS. 
4
 Note that we use information on individuals who are cohabiting, so the possible measurement error problem 
that the practice of inputing the gender for some married couples made by the Census because of a 
misidentification of that characteristic should be mitigated with our sample (Hansen et al., 2019). 
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With respect to our variable of interest, we have obtained the information on same-sex 
marriage from Gerstmann (2017). As mentioned above, the introduction of same-sex 
marriage in the U.S. began in 2003, when Massachusetts became the first state to legally 
recognize same-sex marriage.5 Between 2008 and 2009 four more states (Connecticut, Iowa, 
New Hampshire, and Vermont) and the District of Columbia followed. By 2015, the 
legalization of homosexual marriage had already been established in 37 states (Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the five states 
mentioned above) and District of Columbia. Since 2015, all states have allowed same-sex 
marriage (see Table 1). 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the percentage of U.S. people living in a state having same-
sex marriage was below 10% until 2012 when it rose to 20%. After that, a considerable 
increase is observed until 2015 when 100% of the population live in a state with that marriage 
regulation. This figure also shows the evolution of the migration flow of homosexuals. We 
have represented there the percentage of homosexual migrants, defined as the number of 
homosexual migrants over the total number of homosexuals at risk of migrating from 2001 
to 2015, which was multiplied by more than four during that period. This increase occurs 
after the introduction of gay marriage in Massachusetts in 2003. Therefore, it can be argued 
that there is a response of the homosexual population to the introduction of same-sex 
marriage. It is also worth noting that the rise in the migration flow of homosexuals does not 
appear to be mitigated over time, pointing to a possible permanent effect. Figure 2 provides 
additional evidence in favor of this possible relationship, since the number of homosexuals 
moving to states without access to same-sex marriage decreased considerably after 2006, 
whereas the number of homosexuals moving to states with access to same-sex marriage 
slightly increased after 2003 and took off after 2008. Thus, it can be surmised that it is not 
the migration flow to states without same-sex marriage which is driving the behavior of the 
homosexual migration. Of course, this is not a conclusive analysis and we need to test it more 
thoroughly.  
4. RESULTS 
a) Same-sex marriage and migration flow of homosexuals 
Table 2 reports our estimates on the effect of same-sex marriage on the migration flow of 
homosexuals. The first column, which includes state- and year-fixed effects in addition to 
state-specific linear and quadratic time trends, shows an increase in the percentage of 
homosexual migrants following the introduction of same-sex marriage. We also observe that 
this positive effect does not fade over subsequent years. Our results point to the possibility 
that states having same-sex marriage would be more attractive for homosexuals. In the other 
                                                            
5
 We are not considering here the effective date of the legislation since the announcement of the introduction 
of same-sex marriage can also attract homosexuals. Note that we are using annual data, so the differences 
between the effective date and the date used here are not likely to have an impact on our dataset.  
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columns, we have separated the sample by gender.6 This is necessary since it can be surmised 
that our estimated coefficients are capturing the responses from gay men in addition 
to/instead of the responses from lesbian women. This argument is based on the idea that there 
can be differences between female and male migration because of possible dissimilarities in 
the factors affecting migration decisions by gender (Enchautegui, 1997). In our setting, it is 
possible to hypothesize that differences in discrimination against gays and lesbians can make 
migration decisions more/less attractive to those individuals. Column 2 incorporates as the 
dependent variable the percentage of gay men, whereas column 3 includes the percentage of 
lesbian women. Estimations indicate some gender differences. A positive and statistically 
significant effect is found in all years subsequent to the introduction of same-sex marriage 
for gay men. However, this effect is only detected five to six years after the introduction of 
same-sex marriage for lesbian women, which may point to a late migration process as a 
consequence of same-sex marriage. In column 4, we run the analysis without those states and 
years in which there is no available separate information about gay men or lesbian women, 
and the estimated coefficients are very similar to those obtained in the first column. 
Although all our previous specifications incorporate controls for unobservable 
characteristics that can vary at the state level and/or over time, we run additional regressions 
to check whether our findings are driven by omitted economic and/or demographic variables. 
The impact of these omitted variables, if correlated with the outcome of interest, could be 
captured by the coefficients measuring the effect of same-sex marriage legalization. To tackle 
this issue, we add more controls to our baseline regression (see Table 3). Since the 
characteristics of the individuals (e.g., race, education) living in a state can make it more/less 
attractive to the individuals living in the rest of the country, we have added controls by state 
and year for the proportion of individuals by race (white and black) and education (the 
proportion of people who has completed high school, one to three years of college, and four 
or more years of college). The economic situation of the potential state of residence may also 
affect migration decisions, and for this reason we have added the employment rate by state 
and year. After adding these variables in column 1 of Table 3, the dynamic response of 
homosexuals to the introduction of same-sex marriage is quite similar. Our results are also 
maintained when we include all these controls in male and female samples (see columns 2 
and 3).7  
To reinforce the consistency of previous results, we estimate supplementary analysis 
using different samples. Results are reported in Table 4. We have first redefined the sample 
of homosexuals including not only those individuals who can legally marry but also those 
married homosexuals. The observed effect of same-sex marriage on the migration flow of 
those who can legally marry could be due to a change in the population at risk of marrying, 
since it can be assumed that there are fewer homosexuals who can legally marry after the 
introduction of same-sex marriage (some of them have had access to marriage). Columns 1 
and 2 (with controls for observable characteristics at the state level) report our results. As 
                                                            
6 The variation in the sample size is due to the availability of separate information for women and men.  
7 We have re-run these specifications including each of these additional controls separately and results do not 
vary. 
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both columns show, our conclusions are maintained and the coefficients do not change 
with/without those married homosexuals. Then, a possible decrease in the homosexual 
population who can legally marry is not driving our findings. We have tested our findings 
considering a young sample since younger individuals can have different incentives to 
change their place of residence than older individuals. Results are displayed in columns 3 
and 4 for a sample of individuals aged 25 to 45 years old. Our estimations appear to reveal a 
later migration process for this sample since we find that the effect of same-sex marriage is 
positive and statistically significant three to four years after its introduction. Once again, the 
impact appears to be permanent.  
The migration process in the U.S. is not limited to interstate migration; international 
migration might be affected by the introduction of same-sex marriage. We have extended the 
sample by adding those living in another country in the previous year in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 4. The results are maintained. Also, we repeat the analysis by excluding the non-native 
population since several studies have shown evidence of the existence of differences between 
non-native and native individuals in interstate migration. Rogers and Raymer (1998) find that 
the migration patterns of the foreign-born, in general, have exhibited levels of spatial focus 
that exceed those of their native-born counterparts, and Gurak and Kritz (2000) indicate that 
while human capital factors are the most important sources of differences between 
immigrants and natives in internal migration patterns, contextual dimensions associated with 
the social capital of native groups and state economic conditions strongly influence the 
interstate migration of immigrants. To check whether this is driving our results, we have 
repeated our main analysis including only those homosexuals originating from the U.S. (see 
column 7 and 8). Results are unchanged, and so the behavior of non-native individuals does 
not appear to affect to our findings. However, it is possible to suppose that the behavior of 
the non-native individuals differs depending on their country of origin since there are 
considerable differences in the way same-sex relations are considered throughout the world. 
We revisit this issue below when we explore the behavior of non-native individuals 
originating from non-tolerant countries (where same-sex relations are illegal). In short, all 
the results described in this section suggest that the introduction of same-sex marriage 
positively affects the migration flow of homosexuals to those states that have same-sex 
marriage, and this does not disappear over time.  
b) Is it the effect of same-sex marriage, or is it the effect of other regulations? 
Same-sex marriage legalization was accompanied by related legal changes that may also have 
affected the interstate migration of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) people. During 
our period of study, four states (California, Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode Island) and the 
District of Columbia introduced laws aiming to prohibit discrimination by adoption agencies 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Since the 
time of these legal changes varies by state, it could be possible that our estimated coefficient 
capturing the effect of same-sex marriage might be capturing the effect of the prohibition of 
discrimination based on gender identity in adoption rather than the introduction of same-sex 
marriage. 
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There have been other important developments. From the 1990s, regulations were 
introduced prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity in either employment, 
housing, and/or public accommodation. By 2019, 21 states and the District of Columbia have 
such laws (see Appendix for a detailed review of the legislation) (Movement Advancement 
Project, 2019). Similarly, policies for changing gender markers on birth certificates vary state 
by state. By 2019, 22 states and the District of Columbia have issued new style birth 
certificates with new gender markers (see Appendix) (Movement Advancement Project, 
2019). From the 1970s, some states began to repeal their sodomy laws. These laws made 
certain kinds of sexual activity illegal. By 2003, 36 states and the District of Columbia had 
repealed them (see Appendix) (Kane, 2003). As before, we need to control for this issue to 
observe whether our estimations are capturing the effect of same-sex marriage rather than 
other differences in LGBT legislation across states. 
To capture the impact of all the LGBT related legislation mentioned above, we use the 
variation in the timing of these reforms by adding explanatory variables to control for the 
years since each law was adopted. None of the prior literature considers this legislation in its 
totality, so with regard to previous research on the impact of same-sex marriage on socio-
economic and demographic variables, there can be some concerns about what exactly is being 
picked up by the estimated coefficients on same-sex marriage legalization. Table 5 shows the 
dynamic response of interstate homosexual migration to same-sex marriage legalization, 
after controlling for the prohibition of discrimination based on gender identity in adoption 
(column 1); employment (column 2); housing (column 3); public accommodation (column 
4); the approval of gender marker changes on birth certificates (column 5); and the 
introduction of the repeal of sodomy laws (column 6). All are included in column 7. It is 
reassuring to observe that, even after adding those controls, our findings are unaffected, 
which suggests that it was not the LGBT related legal changes that are driving our findings. 
It therefore appears that the same-sex marriage does play a role in the migration flow of 
homosexuals. 
c) Physical distance 
Up to this point, we have focused on the relationship between same-sex marriage legalization 
and interstate homosexual migration. In this section, we examine whether that relationship 
varies depending on physical distance between sending and receiving states. The literature 
on this subject offers a consensus on the effect of distance on migration (Davies et al., 2001). 
Prior research has shown that, among the variables affecting the costs of migration, distance 
between destination and origin appears to be one of the most important: the further away the 
two places are, the higher the monetary travel costs for the initial move, as well as for visits 
back home (Long et al., 1988; Mayda, 2010). Another explanation as to why distance may 
negatively affect migration is that it is costlier to acquire information about far-away places 
(Greenwood, 1997; Lucas, 2001).  
To analyze the importance of physical distance, we have re-run the entire analysis, 
considering homosexuals migrating between contiguous states, non-contiguous states, 
between states at a distance of 1000 km or less, 2000 km or less, and 3000 km or less. As can 
11 
 
be seen in Table 6, our findings are not consistent with the previous literature, pointing to a 
non-statistically significant effect of same-sex marriage legalization for migration flow 
among bordering states (see column 1). However, when we extend the distance, the estimates 
for homosexuals moving between non-contiguous states and those migrating to a distant of 
less than 1000, 2000 or 3000 km (columns 2 to 5) show a statistically significant effect even 
seven years after the introduction of same-sex marriage legislation. These findings should be 
approached with caution since it can depend on the timing of its introduction. Figure 3 
illustrates this temporal evolution using a map. After Massachusetts introduced the first 
same-sex marriage legislation, no other state followed until five years later, in 2008, and was 
not until 2014 that a large number of states did likewise. In this setting, since the number of 
states with same-sex marriage before 2014 was quite small, the majority of homosexuals who 
wanted to live in a state allowing same-sex marriage before then had to move to non-
contiguous states. It is not until the end of our period of study that the majority of 
homosexuals had the opportunity to move to a contiguous state allowing same-sex marriage. 
In any case, it is reassuring that the physical distance between states does not affect our 
estimations. 
d) The effect of same-sex marriage legalization on the stock of homosexual 
migrants 
To our knowledge, there is only one paper that explores the possible impact of same-sex 
marriage on migration decisions at the individual level (Beaudin, 2017). However, there are 
no studies of the possible effect of same-sex marriage on the geographical distribution of 
homosexuals across the U.S. Beaudin (2017) points to the possibility of an increasing 
imbalance in the distribution of homosexuals, but without providing empirical evidence. In 
our work, we examine the impact of same-sex marriage on the stock of homosexuals by state. 
Formally, we estimate this using the following equation: ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௖௧ ൌ Σୱߚ௦݈݈݁݃ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௖௧௦ ൅ Σୡܵݐܽݐ݁ܨܧ௖ ൅ Σ୲ܻ݁ܽݎܨܧ௧൅	ሾΣୡܵݐܽݐ݁௖ ൈܶ݅݉݁௧ ൅ Σୡܵݐܽݐ݁௖ ൈ ܶ݅݉݁௧ଶሿ ൅ ݑ௖௧							ሺ2ሻ  
where ܵݐ݋ܿ݇௖௧ is defined as the number of homosexuals living in state c in year t per one 
hundred inhabitants. The rest of the variables have been defined before. We would expect ߚ௦ 
parameters to be positive since the impact on the migration flow appears to be positive and 
permanent. Table 7 presents the estimations in columns 1 and 2 (with additional controls). 
There appears to be empirical evidence in favor of an increase in the stock of homosexuals 
following the introduction of same-sex marriage, but after five to six years no statistically 
significant coefficient is detected. The positive effect on inflow migration is not translated to 
any significant degree into the stock of homosexuals. Thus, after five to six years there is no 
clear empirical evidence of a change in the geographical distribution of homosexuals as a 
consequence of same-sex marriage. 
e) The effect of same-sex marriage on non-native individuals originating from 
non-tolerant countries 
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There can be some specific individuals for whom the introduction of same-sex marriage in a 
state can reduce the attractiveness of moving there. States having same-sex marriage would 
perhaps unsurprisingly not be culturally similar to non-tolerant countries in terms of sexual 
orientation. We are going to study this issue in this subsection. It can also be argued that 
tolerant states (those with same-sex marriage) would be more attractive for those individuals 
who flee persecution because of the criminalization of same-sex relations in their country of 
origin. Unfortunately, this relationship cannot be examined since there is no available 
information. Data on asylum seekers by type of persecution (including gender identity and 
sexual orientation) is quite scarce (see some data on the Center for Gender & Refugee 
Studies).  
 Focusing on the possible negative effect that cultural differences can generate, we 
calculate the percentage of non-native individuals originating from non-tolerant countries 
moving from one state to another over the total number of non-native individuals originating 
from non-tolerant countries who are at risk of migrating (and multiplied by 100). The sample 
selection of individuals is the same as before, that is, we have selected individuals between 
the ages of 25 and 64 who can legally marry. Those non-tolerant countries of origin are 
classified following the information provided by the ILGA in 2019. All countries for which 
same-sex relations are not legal for men in the period under examination are considered here 
as non-tolerant countries. As can be observed in Table 8, our estimations suggest that same-
sex marriage reduces the incentive for non-native individuals originating from non-tolerant 
countries to move to a state that permits same-sex marriage. All coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant. The effect is also permanent here. This provides additional evidence 
that same-sex marriage may encourage social acceptance of homosexuals which can diminish 
the attractiveness of those places for individuals originating from less tolerant countries. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the same-sex marriage on the interstate 
migration evolution of homosexuals in the United States. Since LGBT people attempt to 
leave discriminatory regions in search of more tolerant ones (those allowing homosexual 
couples to legally marry), those states having same-sex marriage can be more attractive in 
terms of migration for homosexuals. But also, the mere access to marriage can encourage 
individuals to move to states having same-sex marriage if their lifetime expected utility in 
marriage is greater than that obtained in other forms of partnership or in singlehood (Black 
et al., 2007). From a theoretical point of view, the expected effect on the migration flow of 
homosexual appears to be positive.  
To examine this issue, we use data covering the 50 states of the U.S. and the District 
of Columbia. Our results suggest that the introduction of same-sex marriage has a positive 
and permanent effect on the interstate migration flow of homosexuals to states having same-
sex marriage. This response of homosexual migration to same-sex marriage regulation is 
robust after controlling for state- and year-fixed effects, and after the inclusion of state-
specific linear and quadratic trends. Our findings are also unaltered after adding controls for 
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observable state-specific factors, to different subsamples, and in consideration of the physical 
distance between sending and receiving states, which does not appear to matter in this 
scenario. 
A potential concern with prior research on the impact of same-sex marriage legislation 
on socio-demographic outcomes is that it omits other legal reforms affecting LGBT 
individuals. It could be surmised that they are driving our results. The battle for LGBT rights 
has not ended, since even now LGBT parents and their children in some states of the U.S. 
can be refused by social services or ejected from a business by someone who cites a religious 
belief. In our paper, we show that the effect of same-sex marriage on homosexual migration 
between states is robust to the control of the prohibition of discrimination based on gender 
identity in adoption, employment, housing and public accommodation, the legalization of 
gender marker change on birth certificates, and the repeal of sodomy laws.  
This study is the first that examines the dynamic response to same-sex marriage in 
terms of migration. Moreover, by exploiting the different timing of homosexual marriage 
legislation, this research fills a gap in the literature by exploring the impact of same-sex 
marriage on the geographical distribution of homosexuals in the U.S. Results appear to point 
to a positive but temporary effect. After five to six years, the positive effect on inflow 
migration is not translated to a statistically significant effect on the distribution of 
homosexuals in the U.S. Same-sex marriage legislation appears to play a role in the 
movement of homosexuals across the U.S. but it is not sufficiently important to change their 
spatial distribution. 
 The existence of different social attitudes towards homosexuality can also generate 
outflow migration of those individuals who are less tolerant of same-sex relationships. We 
test this using data on the migration behavior of non-native individuals originating from non-
tolerant countries (in which same-sex relations are illegal). These individuals may consider 
states that permit same-sex marriage to be less attractive because the cultural differences with 
their home countries discourages them from moving there. Our findings appear to confirm 
this. We observe a negative effect on the interstate migration of non-native migrants 
originating from non-tolerant countries following the introduction of same-sex marriage. 
This provides additional evidence that cultural differences regarding homosexuality may be 
of significance in the migration decisions of some individuals.  
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Figure 1: Percentage of individuals living in a state with same-sex marriage and 
percentage of homosexual migrants during the period 2001-2015 
  
Note: Data comes from IPUMS. 
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Figure 2: Homosexuals migrating to states allowing same-sex marriage vs 
homosexuals migrating to states not allowing same-sex marriage 
 
 
Note: This figure has been calculated using data from IPUMS. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of same-sex marriage across states 
 
Note: This figure presents a map showing the different years of the introduction of same-sex marriage.  
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Table 1: Data on the year of same-sex legalization 
State Year same-sex marriage legalization 
Alabama 2015 
Alaska 2014 
Arizona 2014 
Arkansas 2015 
California 2013 
Colorado 2014 
Connecticut 2008 
Delaware 2013 
District of Columbia 2009 
Florida 2015 
Georgia 2015 
Hawaii 2013 
Idaho 2014 
Illinois 2013 
Indiana 2014 
Iowa 2009 
Kansas 2014 
Kentucky 2015 
Louisiana 2015 
Maine 2012 
Maryland 2012 
Massachusetts 2003 
Michigan 2015 
Minnesota 2013 
Mississippi 2015 
Missouri 2015 
Montana 2014 
Nebraska 2015 
Nevada 2014 
New Hampshire 2009 
New Jersey 2013 
New Mexico 2013 
New York 2011 
North Carolina 2014 
North Dakota 2015 
Ohio 2015 
Oklahoma 2014 
Oregon 2014 
Pennsylvania 2014 
Rhode Island 2013 
South Carolina 2014 
South Dakota 2015 
Tennessee 2015 
Texas 2015 
Utah 2014 
Vermont 2009 
Virginia 2014 
Washington 2012 
West Virginia 2014 
Wisconsin 2014 
Wyoming 2014 
Note: This table shows the year in which same-sex marriage 
was legalized in each state.  
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Table 2: The effect of same-sex marriage legalization on the percentage of homosexual 
migrants 
Dependent variable: Percentage of 
homosexual migrants (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Same-sex marriage 1–2 0.039*** 0.059*** 0.024 0.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) 
Same-sex marriage 3-4 0.135*** 0.233*** 0.056 0.135*** 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.040) (0.031) 
Same-sex marriage 5-6 0.188*** 0.274*** 0.125* 0.187*** 
 (0.052) (0.073) (0.067) (0.053) 
Same-sex marriage >7 0.296*** 0.367*** 0.265*** 0.296*** 
 (0.071) (0.102) (0.089) (0.072) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*time Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 760 763 752 
R2 0.781 0.777 0.549 0.781 
Note: Column 1 shows our baseline estimate. We have excluded lesbian women in column 2 and gay men in 
column 3. In column 4, we have repeated the main analysis without those states and years in which there is 
not available information about lesbian women or gay men. Estimates are weighted. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3: Adding additional controls 
Dependent variable: Percentage of homosexual migrants (1) (2) (3) 
Same-sex marriage 1–2 0.038*** 0.054*** 0.028 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) 
Same-sex marriage  3-4 0.137*** 0.222*** 0.070* 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.041) 
Same-sex marriage 5-6 0.189*** 0.258*** 0.140** 
 (0.053) (0.074) (0.068) 
Same-sex marriage >7 0.298*** 0.341*** 0.293*** 
 (0.073) (0.104) (0.091) 
White  0.224 -0.495 1.017* 
 (0.400) (0.546) (0.522) 
Black -0.656 0.897 -1.407 
 (1.618) (2.193) (2.138) 
High school graduate 1.049 2.405* -0.184 
 (0.922) (1.264) (1.202) 
Some college -0.320 -0.232 -0.446 
 (1.023) (1.407) (1.331) 
More college -0.427 -0.523 -0.194 
 (1.099) (1.504) (1.434) 
Employment rate 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
State*time Yes Yes Yes 
State*time2 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 760 763 
R2 0.782 0.781 0.553 
Note: All columns include controls for the proportion of white and black individuals, the proportion of individuals 
who have completed high school, who have studied 1 to 3 years of college, who have studied 4 or more years of 
college, and the employment rate by state and year. Lesbian women have been excluded in column 5, and gay men 
have been excluded in column 6. Estimates are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 4: More robustness checks 
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of homosexual 
migrants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Same-sex marriage 1–2 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.004 0.005 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.032** 0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Same-sex marriage 3-4 0.133*** 0.136*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.050) (0.050) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
Same-sex marriage  5-6 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.173*** 0.182*** 0.157*** 0.149*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.083) (0.084) (0.056) (0.057) (0.051) (0.052) 
Same-sex marriage >7 0.289*** 0.296*** 0.381*** 0.394*** 0.279*** 0.292*** 0.254*** 0.240*** 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.113) (0.115) (0.076) (0.078) (0.069) (0.071) 
White  0.207  -0.552  0.292  0.183 
  (0.399)  (0.626)  (0.430)  (0.391) 
Black  -0.636  -1.853  -0.978  -2.014 
  (1.611)  (2.515)  (1.742)  (1.563) 
High school graduate  0.724  1.573  0.290  1.372 
  (0.921)  (1.451)  (0.993)  (0.888) 
Some college  -0.515  -1.905  -0.757  -0.317 
  (1.022)  (1.591)  (1.102)  (0.983) 
More college  -0.545  -0.319  -1.609  -0.498 
  (1.098)  (1.714)  (1.183)  (1.056) 
Employment rate  0.002  0.015**  0.002  -0.005 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 764 764 765 765 765 765 
R2 0.781 0.782 0.720 0.725 0.811 0.813 0.767 0.770 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 include married individuals. Columns 3 and 4 include those individuals who are between 25 and 45 years old. Those individuals who lived in other 
country the year before have been included in addition to those individuals who lived in a different state in the previous year, in columns 5 and 6. Columns 7 and 8 only include 
those individuals who are originating from the US. Estimates are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5: The effect of same-sex marriage on the percentage of homosexual migrants including other laws 
Dependent variable: Percentage of homosexual moving people (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Same-sex marriage 1–2 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Same-sex marriage 3-4 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Same-sex marriage 5-6 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.194*** 0.201*** 0.187*** 0.213*** 0.221*** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056) 
Same-sex marriage >7 0.289*** 0.293*** 0.305*** 0.309*** 0.295*** 0.337*** 0.350*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.075) (0.076) 
Prohibition of discrimination by adoption agencies   0.039      0.020 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity (0.033)      (0.038) 
Prohibition of discrimination based on   0.006     0.066** 
gender identity in employment  (0.017)     (0.032) 
Prohibition of discrimination based on    -0.022    -0.054 
gender identity in housing   (0.017)    (0.034) 
Prohibition of discrimination based on     -0.028   -0.035 
gender identity in public accommodations    (0.018)   (0.029) 
Allowing a gender marker change      0.002  0.000 
on birth certificates     (0.016)  (0.016) 
The repeal of sodomy laws      0.151 0.167* 
      (0.095) (0.095) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 765 765 765 765 
R2 0.782 0.781 0.782 0.782 0.781 0.782 0.786 
Notes: Columns show results after prohibiting discrimination by adoption agencies and officials based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the prohibition of discrimination based on gen
identity in employment, housing and public accommodation, the approval of gender marker change on birth certificates, and the introduction of the repeal of sodomy laws, respectively. Estima
are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6: The effect of same-sex marriage on the percentage of homosexual migrants by 
physical distance 
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of homosexual 
migrants 
Contiguous 
states 
Non-
contiguous 
states 
Distance at 
or less than 
1000km 
Distance at 
or less than 
2000km 
Distance at 
or less than 
3000km 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Same-sex marriage 1–2 -0.010 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) 
Same-sex marriage 3-4 -0.018 0.153*** 0.145*** 0.120*** 0.072*** 
 (0.014) (0.027) (0.023) (0.019) (0.015) 
Same-sex marriage 5-6 -0.038* 0.226*** 0.210*** 0.167*** 0.101*** 
 (0.023) (0.046) (0.039) (0.031) (0.025) 
Same-sex marriage >7 -0.044 0.339*** 0.327*** 0.292*** 0.198*** 
 (0.031) (0.063) (0.053) (0.043) (0.034) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State*time2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 765 765 765 
R2 0.366 0.797 0.834 0.833 0.807 
Note: The dependent variable has been defined as the percentage of homosexual migrants between contiguous states and 
non-contiguous states in columns 1 and 2, respectively. That variable has been defined as the percentage of homosexual 
migrants coming from a distance of 1000, 2000 and 3000 km or less in columns 3,4 and 5, respectively. Estimates are 
weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant 
at the 10% level.   
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Table 7: The effect of same-sex marriage on the stock of homosexual migrants 
Dependent variable: Percentage of homosexuals (1) (2) 
Same-sex marriage 1–2 0.040*** 0.041*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Same-sex marriage 3-4 0.103*** 0.107*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) 
Same-sex marriage 5-6 0.059 0.065 
 (0.054) (0.055) 
Same-sex marriage  >7 0.113 0.121 
 (0.080) (0.080) 
White  -0.475 
  (0.444) 
Black  -0.450 
  (1.324) 
High school graduate  -0.411 
  (0.711) 
Some college  -0.309 
  (0.766) 
More college  -1.463* 
  (0.845) 
Employment rate  -0.001 
  (0.004) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Country*time Yes Yes 
Country*time2 Yes Yes 
Observations 765 765 
R2 0.880 0.881 
Note: Estimations show the effect of same-sex marriage on the stock of homosexual migrants. ***Significant at the 1% 
level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 8: The effect of same-sex marriage on the non-native individuals 
originating from non-tolerant countries 
Dependent variable: 
Percentage of non-native 
individuals  
(1) 
  
Same-sex marriage  1–2 -0.095*** 
 (0.019) 
Same-sex marriage 3-4 -0.132*** 
 (0.040) 
Same-sex marriage 5-6 -0.157** 
 (0.068) 
Same-sex marriage >7 -0.195* 
 (0.102) 
Year FE Yes 
State FE Yes 
State*time Yes 
State*time2 Yes 
Observations 736 
R2 0.647 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Data on the year of the introduction of other laws 
State 
Year 
discrimination 
based on 
gender 
identify in 
adoption 
banned 
Year 
discrimination 
based on 
gender 
identify in 
employment 
banned 
Year 
discrimination 
based on 
gender 
identify in 
housing 
banned 
Year 
discrimination  
based on gender 
identify in 
public 
accommodations 
Year gender 
marker 
change on 
birth 
certificates 
allowed 
Year the 
repeal of 
sodomy laws 
Alabama     1992  
Alaska     2012 1978 
Arizona     2006 2001 
Arkansas     1995 2002 
California 2003 2003 2004 2005 2014 1975 
Colorado  2007 2008 2008 2019 1971 
Connecticut  2011 2004 2011 2012 1969 
Delaware  2013 2013 2013 2017 1972 
District of Columbia 1977 2006 2006 2006 2013 1993 
Florida     2018  
Georgia     2005 1998 
Hawaii  2011 2005 2006 2015 1972 
Idaho     2018  
Illinois  2005 2005 2005 2017 1961 
Indiana     2006 1976 
Iowa  2007 2007 2007 2004 1976 
Kansas     2019  
Kentucky     2005 1992 
Louisiana     2006  
Maine  2005 2005 2005 2005 1975 
Maryland 2019 2014 2014 2014 2006 1999 
Massachusetts  2011 2011 2016 2006 2002 
Michigan     2006  
Minnesota  1993 1993 1993 2006 2001 
Mississippi     2006  
Missouri     2006  
Montana     2017 1997 
Nebraska     2005 1977 
Nevada 2015 2011 2011 2011 2006 1993 
New Hampshire  2018 2018 2018 2006 1973 
New Jersey 2019 2007 2007 2007 2013 1978 
New Mexico  2003 2003 2003 2019 1975 
New York 2019 2015 2015 2015 2014 1980 
North Carolina     2005  
North Dakota     2005 1973 
Ohio      1972 
Oklahoma       
Oregon 2007 2007 2007 2007 2017 1971 
Pennsylvania     2016 1980 
Rhode Island 2015 2001 2001 2001 2005 1998 
South Carolina       
South Dakota      1976 
Tennessee      1996 
Texas       
Utah  2015 2015  2004  
Vermont  2007 2007 2007 2011 1977 
Virginia     2006  
Washington  2006 2006 2006 2018 1975 
West Virginia     2006 1976 
Wisconsin     2006 1983 
Wyoming         2005 1977 
Notes: This table shows the year in which each law was introduced in each state. Column 2 presents the first 
year in which employment non-discrimination law covers sexual orientation and gender identity. Column 3 
shows the timing of the law introducing housing non-discrimination law covers sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Column 4 shows the first year in which public accommodations non-discrimination law enumerates 
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sexual orientation and gender identity. Data for these fourth columns come to the Movement Advancement 
Project. Last column lists the year in which states have decriminalized sodomy. Data come from Kane (2003)
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